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ABSTRACT
Cultural Dimensions of Relations Between 
Turkey and The European Union 
Fadime Bozta§
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss
The relations between The European Union and Turkey is one of the 
problematic issues of International Relations. However, by now the debate 
revolved around a limited scope considering economic, political and security 
issues. Evaluating Turkey’s longing for the membership to The European 
Union only with the explanation of; searching for a strong economic partner 
would be incomplete. The initiator of this motivation is the identity crisis of 
Turkish society. Turkey being a society in between; modern and traditional, 
secular and Muslim, Eastern and Western, wants to settle this discussion 
being a part of Europe. This reality evokes the unvoiced dimension of cultural 
incompatibility and power of the cultural boundaries, assessing the relations. 
This study tries to carve out the importance of culture and identity related 
issues in Turkey and The European Union relations within the parameters of 
Critical Theory and seeks answers to the questions; To what extend Turkey 
can be a part of Europe?’ and To what extend Europe can enlarge its cultural 
boundaries?’.
Ill
ÖZET
Türkiye Avrupa Birliği İlişkilerinde 
Kültürel Boyut 
Fadime Boztaş
Danışman; Assist. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss
Türkiye -  Avrupa Birliği ilişkileri, Uluslararası İlişkiler alanının en problemli 
konularından biridir. Ancak bugüne kadar hep ekonomi, politika ve güvenlik 
konuları baz alınarak dar bir çerçevede tartışılmıştır. Türkiye’nin üyelik 
konusundaki ısrarını sadece güçlü bir ekonomik ortaklık arayışı olarak 
algılamak eksik bir tanımlama olacaktır. Bu motivasyonun ana nedeni Türk 
toplumunun kimlik krizidir. Türkiye; Modernité ve gelenek, laiklik ve İslam, 
Doğu ve Batı kavramları arasında kalmış bir toplum olarak, kimlik krizi 
problemini Avrupa Birliği’ne üye olarak çözmek istemektedir. Bu gerçek, 
kültürel uyumsuzluğun dile getirilmeyen boyutlarını ve ilişkileri belirleyen 
kültürel sınırların gücünü ortaya koymaktadır. Bu çalışma Türkiye Avrupa 
Birliği ilişkilerinde kültür ve kimlik konularının önemini Eleştirel Teori 
parametreleri içerisinde ortaya çıkarmaya çalışmaktadır ve Türkiye ne kadar 
Avrupa’nın parçası olabilir?’ ve ‘Avrupa kendi kültürel sınırlarını ne kadar 
genişletebilir?’ gibi sorulara cevap aramaktadır.
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INTRODUCTION
"Europe has no boundaries. It starts and ends in 
cultural boundaries; in peoples mind".
W. Wallace
This study is designed to put forward the importance of culture and 
dilemma of identity formation within the realm of international relations. These 
two determining concepts remained silent as security issues, economic 
pressures, and other predominant problem areas have constituted the basic 
parameters of analysis by now. However the relations between Turkey and 
The European Union can not be evaluated by silencing the dimensions of 
culture and heritage of social identity formation process.
The study tries to curve out the influence and dominating power of 
these two concepts, making their existence explicit. These officially unvoiced 
dimensions are the real impulses behind Turkey’s push towards Europe and 
The European Union's resistance against Turkey's membership. This study 
problematizes Turkey's push for the full membership as a historical longing to 
be identified within the boundaries of Europe. Especially after 1980s foreign 
policy makers in Turkey formulated being part of The European Union as a 
legitimization tool. As a member of The European Union, attaining European 
identity, Turkey would have gained legitimacy both in the international arena 
and within the Turkish society. That intrinsic fact made the issue of the 
membership turned out to be an issue of honor. Foreign Minister of Turkey 
Ismail Cem is blaming European Union for making Turkey losing face and
humiliating Turkey in the international arena. On the other hand The Europe 
Union is trying to formulate its relations with Turkey in a different way, locating 
Turkey in a unique category and differentiating it from the other applicants.
The reason behind these motives lies in the historical construction of 
the relations of these two exclusive cultures. Ayse Kadioglu signifies the 
importance of cultural dimension saying
"There are many factors that stand in the way of Turkey's eventual 
membership. First and perhaps the inherently significant but officially 
unvoiced barrier is cultural and religious one. The two identities if pushed 
beyond their limits are mutually exclusive at best and antagonistic at 
worst". ^
Ahmet Evin stresses the importance of culture stating;
"Cultural issues seem to create a greater confusion, and throw more 
obstacles in the way obtaining a clear debate on Euro-Turkish relations, 
than a concrete range of problems such as security considerations, 
economic relations, degree of market integration and possibly even 
harmonization of legislation. They do so because cultural compatibility is a 
subject that is open to speculation. There are different perceptions with 
respect to how well Turkey might fit into the European cultural arena. 
Moreover, the seeming inability to come to terms with the deeply-rooted 
fears and suspicions on both sides stands in the way of obtaining a 
coherent vision of Turkey's integration into Europe".^
As Udo Steinbach puts, "Europe has not only geographical boundaries 
but cultural boundaries as well ... culture become a legitimacy for integration 
among the members". ^
Ayşe Kadioglu, “Europanization of tlie EU: Lessons o f the Turkish Experience”, Unpublished Paper 
 ^ Alimet Evin, “Turkey-EU Relations on tlie eve o f Intergovernmental Conferences: Tlie Social and 
Cultural Dimension” in Turkey and European Union: Nebulous Nature o f Relations, Turkish Foreign 
Policy Institute, March 1996, Ankara, p.36
 ^Udo Steinbach, “Turkey-EEC Relations; Tlie Cultural Dimension in Erol Manisali, Turkey’s Place in 
Europe; Economic, Political and Cultural Dimensions, Tlie Middle East Business and Banking 
Magazine Publication, 1988, p.l3.
This study try to assess culture as something external to the society 
(because it is an output of interactive historical experiences and 
counteractions), instrumentalising the critical theory. The question of Turkey's 
integration to The European Union brings in two important and inseparable 
historical sharing of the two cultures; Modernization and Orientalism. 
Evaluating on the grift relation of these two concepts within the parameters of 
critical theory, the analysis work through to answer the questions. 'Can Turkey 
be a part of Europe?' and 'Is Europe ready to absorb the new comer within its 
boundaries as a European partner?'.
The first chapter is a debate on 'culture', 'identity' and ‘critical theory' 
which consists of two parts. In the first section the guide line is to explore the 
relations between the Western and the Eastern cultures within the parameters 
of modernization and discourse of Orientalism. And evaluate on the question 
'How modernization and Orientalism worked through to create collective 
identities within two exclusive cultures'. Second part is designed to give brief 
insight concerning Critical Theory and its criticisms on Modernization.
The second chapter is further enriches the theoretical discussion in 
two parts elaborating the reasons of identity crisis in the Eastern societies and 
focusing on Turkish society in its modernization process.
The third chapter problematized the relation between East and West 
within the realm of Turkey and The European Union relations analyzing the 
dynamics of relations in four parts. The first part analyses the mapping of
European identity in relation with the Turks and mapping of Turkish identity in 
relation with Europe. Second part consists of the debates considering the 
Formation and Formulation of The European Union and historical analysis of 
Turkey - European Union relations. Third part is designed to put forward 
European Union's expansion practices. The last section is a comparison of 
European Union' s stand towards East considering Visegard countries and 
Turkey.
Many economic and political concerns can be counted as the causes 
that makes the 'process' painful, however rather than concentrating on 
instrumental integration with the European Union through the rationalization of 
political and bureaucratic institutions, this thesis will deal with a rather more 
'unconscious' or better to say 'concealed' aspects of the problem. It is the 
identity related - cultural aspect what makes the European Union - Turkey 
relation's painful, felt even by an ordinary citizen living in Turkey. What makes 
it that sensitive is its identity related aspect. The longing for becoming a 
modern (read: Western) subject and the fear of going to the inverse extremes 
that came with the repeated refusal of Turkey's membership to the European 
Union brings the importance of how identity related issues became crucial for 
studying Turkey - European Union relations.
CHAPTER 1:
DEBATES ON IDENTITY, CULTURE AND CRITICAL THEORY
This theoretical chapter will analyze why Critical Theory has been 
instrumentalized to discuss the subject, how cultural studies can be helpful in 
defining the relation of the two partners and how important culture and identity 
are for the field of International Relations.
If the love and hate relation between Turkey and Europe ends up in a 
marriage, this would not be something made out of pure reason, but rather 
would be a natural outcome of hundred years old conditional engagement 
made under the shadow of internalized Orientalism and inevitable 
enforcement of Modernization.
As being the motors of relations between Turkey and Europe, 
Orientalism and Modernism deserve a deeper consideration. Berman defines 
modernity as a mode of vital experience which is a collective sharing of a 
particularized sense of “the self and “other", which was determined by 
“space”, “time” and “being”"^. As During argues, “modernization is a continuos 
process of social reconstruction that is accelerated to produce a significant
recomposition of space, time and being ..5
‘'Edward Soja, “History, Geography and Modernity” in Simon During (eds) The Cultural Studies 
Reader, Blackwell, London, 1995, p .l47  
 ^ ibid, p .l49
This tripartide formula of space, time and being are ingredients of 
culture that became the subject of this study, and will be examined with 
relation to identity, power, hegemony and discourse.
The discourse which overwhelmingly puts forward the power relation 
between cultures and identities is Orientalism. Because, without analysing 
Orientalism one can not understand the systemic hegemony of European 
culture managing and producing the Orient politically. Since cultures and 
histories can not be understood without their relation to power, we will 
instrumentalise the discourse of power; Orientalism.
Let us concentrate on the social parameters in which dynamics of 
Modernization and Orientalism works through to create the collective 
conscioussness and identity.
A) Identity and Its Relation with Culture
Literally, the concept of identity is generally perceived as something 
regarding the individual and not something related to society. Likewise, 
substituting the national identity concept in order to frame the social identity 
along with its limited conceptual reality can not be helpful to understand what 
is going on in the international arena. The social, collective identity’ of a 
society has various dimensions, which is shaped by history, culture and power 
relations with the 'other’. Cornell West notes that
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“Identity is fundamentaily about desire and death. How you 
construct your identity is predicated on how you construct desire, and how 
you conceive death; desire for recognition, quest for visibility, a deep desire 
for association. It is the longing to belonging. And there is a desire for 
security, protection, safety. People construct their identities in a way that 
they are willing to die for it (soldiers in Middle East) and under a national 
identity they are willing to kill “others”, so identity is about binding"^
Identity for the society is something binding individuals. This very 
feature of identity makes it comprehensive and crucial and one of the most 
important ingredients of international affairs and relations. Another crucial 
element making identity important for society is discrimination. It is a process 
that establishes superiority or inferiority.
Actually identity is historicized within these two important realms. In this 
process some of the identities become silent and subject to redefinition. So it 
would not be wrong to argue that, constructing the identity like individual,
societies also use the concept of ‘difference’ which is defined by Rutherford as 
the “instinct for demolition, a kind of hybridization, change and becoming’’ .^
The question is ‘who construct the difference’? In the international 
society, difference is framed by the center (West). This mechanism worked 
through the challenge to determine its own territory and protect itself from 
what is not itself. Consequently, the struggle to sustain this cultural duality 
formulates and reproduces inequality and hegemony over the periphery 
(East).
This struggle interferes within the consistency, continuity and self- 
confidence of the subordinated and when cultural identity is under suspicion, it 
becomes a problem area. To understand the effects of this struggle, claiming 
to define an identity in a negative relation with the ‘other’ to protect one’s own 
identity, we have to examine the relation between culture and identity together 
with the realities that enable a culture to have the upper hand in such a 
relation in the international society.
Stuart Hall defines cultural identity in two different ways. According to 
one point of view “cultural identity is the common identity of people having 
single and shared history and ancestors’’®. Another definition argues that 
“cultural identity is a matter of being. There are common and shared features
* Cornell West, “A Matter of Life and Deatli” in Jolm Rajchman (eds) The Identity in Question, 
Routledge, New York, 1995, p .l6
’ Jonatltan Ruüierford, (eds) Identity: Community.Culture,Difference, New York University Press, 
1990, p.8
* Stuart Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora” in Rutlierford Jonattian ibid. p.l74.
but there are also differences”®. The second meaning of identity puts forward a 
concept which is shaped and constructed with change. In that sense, we can 
argue that like every other historical continuity cultural identity is open to 
transformation. Then we have to answer the question of how history changes 
identity. Criticizing the relation between culture and identity would be helpful to 
come up with a solution to this crucial question.
In defining culture, the most suitable definition for this study is made by 
Geertz. As he already noted “culture is simply the ensemble of stories we tell 
ourselves about ourselves” ®^. Other definitions completing the description of 
culture to construct for this study are as follows .Weber points that “culture is 
related to the beliefs and values that people have about their societies, social 
change and the ideal society they seek”^\ As Billington argues “culture is the 
lived practices which characterize a particular society”^^  On the other hand, 
he points out that “culture is the patterns of meaning that any group uses to 
interpret itself And finally but more controversial to the other definitions of 
culture Homi Bhabha emphasizes that
“culture is both transnational and translational; Transnational; 
because contemporary post-colonial discourse are rooted in specific 
histories of cultural displacement; slavery, civilizing mission, third world 
migration to West. Translational; its translationality brought the question 
“how culture signifies of what is signified by culture"'\
’ ibid. p. 174
Ziauddiii Sardar and Boris van Loon, (eds) Introducing Cultural Studies, Totem Books, Cliicago, 
1998, p.5
" quoted in Billington. “Wliat is Culture” in Billington, Strawbridge, Greenstokes, Fitsiinons (eds.) 
Culture and Society, Macmillan, London, 1991, p .l 
ibid, p.28 
ibid, pp.28-9
Homi Bhabha “Freedom’s Basis in tire Indeterminate” in Rajchman, op.cit., p.48
However, what shall be read in between the lines of this study is 
embodied in what Said says about culture: “culture serves authority, and
ultimately the nation state, not because it represses and coerces but because 
it is affirmative, positive and persuasive. Culture is productive”^^ .
In that sense, it would not be wrong to argue that culture is something 
dynamic. Since it is productive, “one state of culture leads to another” ®^. This 
productivity somehow enables adoptibility; “that is; it facilitates human use of 
and participation in the environment, until the context changes, so that it is no 
longer adoptive. When that happens culture may become a trap and may even 
led to a disaster”^^ . Likewise, modernization attempts within Turkish society 
became a trap because society could not adapt itself to the changing structure 
and environment all together and gave birth to a resistance within itself. 
Society is divided into two different cultural identity; those who gave birth to 
change, enforced adaptation to new norms and those who resists such a 
dynamism and enshrined tradition.
The dynamic nature of culture makes change inevitable, but it can not 
determine the quality of the change alone. Actually this dynamism is 
determined by time and space, which would lead to change either as a 
development (slowly) or as a disaster (external; colonialism, revolution, 
political collapse).
'^Winifred L. Amaturo “Literature and International Relations in tlie Production of Intematioiuil 
'Pov/qt" , Millennium, Journal o f International Studies, 1995, VOL: 24, N o:l, p .l.
see, Paul Bohanan, “Introduction”, How Culture Works, Tlie Free Press, New York, 1995.
’’ See “Introduction” in ibid.
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Considering the modernization attempts of Turkey, we can say that, this 
mechanism worked as a disaster. External challenges interfered to the 
process of identity formation by altering the existing culture, but the Western 
oriented redefinition of identity could not be internalized by all the fragments 
of the society. The resistance against the tendency towards Western life styles 
tried to be manipulated and utilized by the state agencies with a monolithic 
ideology, without carving out the reasons and possible outcomes of such a 
manipulation.
Culture can survive only if the society can understand the nature of 
traps and actively seek solutions. One important criterion to prevent traps is to 
make the change explicit that were not conceived and enhanced by the 
society consciously. Actually when the society “avoid thinking about future, 
‘other’ cultures become prisoners of the past, present and future of Western 
Civilization, through avoiding to define their own future, own concepts and 
categories”’® That is how Orientalism works through, shaping and defining 
identity on behalf of the ‘other’.
To avoid traps and subordination, a culture must seek consensus and 
transform itself into a culture of resistance. “The distinctive culture of society 
was something of elitist conception, it was carried by literate, urban, self- 
conscious classes in society. It was a high culture”’ .^ But, what is the degree 
of homogeneity? To what extent does the society share the consensus of 
values and other ingredients in the culture? Because, the consensus between
Sardar and Loon, op.cit., p.88
11
. the high culture and local culture makes the traps visible, explicit and encircles 
the collective consciousness to handle the problem.
According to Durkheim, unifying cultural principle is education, which 
can “subordinate the individual by binding it to the system” °^. However, we can 
argue that, education is not so successful, because despite its subordinating 
affects we still have ‘loosely bounded’ cultures in which there is almost no 
political mobilization for common goals but which still questions the regime.
B) Cultural Studies and Identity
This analysis brings us to a point where we need to understand “How 
culture and formation of cultural identity can be helpful in understanding 
identity formation of a society?” This question may be answered through 
understanding the mission and functioning of cultural studies.
Cultural studies aims to:
1) Examine the subject matter in terms of cultural practices and their relation 
to power.
2) Understand the sociai and politicai context within which it manifests itseif.
3) Understand the two functions of culture within the society as the object of 
study and location of political criticism.
4) Attempt to expose and reconcile the division of knowledge within the 
society.
5) Understand the changing structure of dominance in the society^^
This mechanism works through semiotics. The theory of signs argues 
that language is a cultural phenomenon and it generates meaning in a special
R. M unch, “Culture: Coherent or Incoherent” in R. Munch and Neil J. Sinelser (eds) Theory of  
Culture, University o f California Press, California, 1992. p.4 
ibid, p.5
■' Sardar and Loon, op.cit, p.9
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way, language produces meaning by a system of relations “by producing a 
network of similarities and differences”^^ .
The process that gives signs their meaning is ‘representation’. 
Considering identity the network of similarities and differences are represented 
by the ‘other’. And the most common representation of ‘other’ is the dark side, 
binary opposition of oneself.
Here, we have to instrumentalise the notion of ‘discourse’ to bind all 
these concepts into a need package. “A discourse consists of culturally or 
socially produced groups of ideas containing texts (which contains signs and 
codes) and representation (which represent power in relation with other)” '^’.
Discourse analysis exposes “these structures and locates the discourse 
within wider historical, cultural and social relations”^^ . This wide range 
encompasses the formation of knowledge, domination of knowledge 
(hegemony) and restructuring of knowledge (orientalism).
..26“Hegemony is what binds society without force and/or by consent’ 
The cultural hegemony is achieved when the powerful party supplements its 
economic power by creating intellectual and moral leadership. Since culture is 
one of the key sites where struggle for hegemony takes place, it becomes the
ibid. p. 11
M. Billington, “Semiotics of Culture” in Billington, Strowbridges, Greenstokes, Fitzsimons, op.cit. 
p.38
Sardar and Loon, op.cit. p. 14
^  ibid p .l4
26 ,’ ibid p.49
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conserved arena where struggle between Eastern and Western cultures take 
place.
C) Cultural Hegemony of Orientalism:
Since we are talking about cultural hegemony, we have to make affects 
of cultural hegemony clear using the power / knowledge conceptualization of 
Foucault. According to Foucault “Different knowledge have developed in the 
course of history and knowledge as the form of social control constructed our 
views about normal”^^ . Foucault defines power as “a complex strategic relation
in a society’..28
The purpose of this power / knowledge analysis is to clarify the 
historical connections which became visible in term of power. Foucault wants 
to show “how the rules of formation of discourse are related (linked) to the 
operation of a particular kind of social power'’^^ .
At this point, discourse analysis of Orientalism will be helpful in locating 
culture as an object of study. E. Said introduced to the field of International 
Relations in his book “Orientalism“ °^ in which he seeks to demonstrate a 
dialectic between individual texts and the complex, collective socio-political 
formations of which they form a parf^V
“’Strawbridge, “Culture and Discourse in Billington,(eds) op.cit. p.41 
C. Gordon (eds), Power/Knowledge -.SelectedInterviews and Other Writings (1972-1977) Michel 
Foucault, Harvester Wlieatsheaf, Hertlifordsliire, 1980, p.236. 
ibid.p.l45
Edward Said, Orientalism, Vintage, New York, 1979.
Winifred, op.cit. p.7
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Orientalism can be defined as a “style of thought which is based upon 
an ontological and epistemological distinction made between the Orient and 
the Occident”^^ . Through this epistemological distinction, the West posits an 
identity for itself which is radically separate and ontologically superior 
compared to the East. By this definition, Orientalism “is a systematic discipline 
by which European culture was able to manage -  and even produce -  the 
Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and 
imaginatively”^^ . Such a way of representation made something seem real in 
discourse: “Orientalism is thus a seductive realism” "^'. Said claims that the 
relation between the Orient and Occident is based on power and domination 
and predominant patterns of Western thought reproduce inequality 
guaranteeing the subordination of the Occident in every realm.
The core of Said’ s argument lies in its formulation of culture -  power 
relations. Thus, the organization and reproduction of social life and 
international relations across the globe must be examined and evaluated 
taking power -  culture relations into consideration for the sake of framing a 
realistic point of view.
ibid p.7 
”  ibid p.8 
ibid p.9
15
PART 2
The Relation Between Critical Theory and Culture: Culture as the subject 
of Critical Theory;
The historical imagination is never spaceless and “critical theory has 
written one of the best geographies and already made geographies set the 
stage while willful making of history dictates the action and defines the story
line..35
Post-colonial criticism witnesses an unequal cultural representation and 
contest for domination within the modern world order. This representation is 
formulated around the issue of cultural differences. In order to assimilate 
Habermas and critical theory to our purpose, we could argue that:
The “post-colonial project, at its most general theoretical level, 
seeks to explore the social pathologies-loss of meaning, conditions of 
anomie -  that no longer cluster around the class antagonism, but break up 
into widely scattered historical categories’’^ .^
Critical Theory wants to alter these historically constructed categories 
through a systematic change. “The social theory which rationalize existing 
conditions and serves to promote repetitive behavior do not fit the definition of
E. Soja op.cit. p.l39  
H. Bliabha op.cit. p 47.
16
critical theory. The belief that the world can be changed had always been 
central to critical theory”^^ .
Critical Theory developed as a challenge to the social theories that are 
mystifying the changeability of the world, "the critical historical discourse sets 
itself against abstract and transhistorical universalization, against positivism, 
which proclaimed physical determination of history apart from social origins 
against all conceptualizations which freeze the frangibility of time, the 
possibility of breaking and remarking time” ®^.
Critical Theory together with these two important criteria; historical 
imagination and the need to change history created its own historicism. Critical 
Theory argues that; historical contextualization of social life and social theory 
produced geographical imagination which is under the "implicit subordination 
of space to time”^^ .
So to break-away from subordination of the West, the East has to 
redefine its social categories, make a new historical interpretation, freeing 
space from the domination of time.
"Karl Marx’s thought has been carried over into this century in a number 
of directions, one of which is Critical Theory”'’®. However, critical theory can 
not be qualified as Marxism. According to Zoltán Tar, "Critical Theory is the
”  E. Soja op.cit, p.l39  
ibid. p. 140
39 aibid, p. 140
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document of disintegration of old-central European bourgeois society, socio- 
historical conditions”'^\ Taking this powerful insight of the theory, critical theory 
is enforced in this study to show the affects of Orientalism that led to a certain 
type of modernization in Eastern societies.
Jurgen Habermas is one of the prominent thinkers on Critical Theory. 
His approach to Critical Theory is also the one that will be utilized as a 
theoretical background of this thesis.
Habermas was heavily under the influence of the Frankfurt School after 
World War II and in the 1960’s he was regarded as the leader of the younger 
generation. During the student movements of the 1960s and 1970s he called 
for critical sociology which would examine the sources of alienation in the 
modern world within every institution. In the 1970s and 1980s Habermas 
moved away from Marxism and formed his own general theory of society as 
the “Theory of Communicative Action”.
Habermas wanted to defend “the belief in progress, in a world-historical 
evolution toward the realization of reason”''^ . As a sociological basis for this 
progress Habermas used a particular form of Weber, leaving Weber’ s 
pessimism aside about iron -  cage of bureaucratization and heartless 
capitalist economy.
Randall Collins and Michael Makowski, The Discovery o f Society, McGraw Hill Companies, New 
York, 1989, p.254
David Held Introduction to Critical Theory; Horkheimer to Habermas, University o f California 
Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1980 p.380 
R.Collins and M.Makowski, op.cit. p.259
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“Habermas intends to rescue the progress of reason, by claiming 
that it is the specifically capitalist version of rationalization that is to blame 
for differentiating the systems’ requisites from the life world. In effect, 
capitalism has captured rationalization in a purposive instrumental form; 
hence the task of social reconstruction is to free reason in all its 
dimensions from the narrow applications. Habermas’ end product is what 
he calls the critical theory of society'' .^
It is difficult to define the boundaries of critical theory; critical theory is 
studying political categories, forms of political practice and strategy of 
domination and experience. Moreover, it is involved with examining concepts 
of identity, class and revolution.
Critical theory tries to bring about new alternatives to the existing social 
organizations which had been introduced with the transition to modern society 
from pre-modern society through the imposition of rational communication. It 
is critical about societies which are not fully using the cultural potential that are 
available to them, outflanking the traditional norms. Critical theory is also 
critical about the social scientific approach which is not capable of defining the 
shortcomings of rationalization.
Having such strong claims critical theory has an important task and it 
starts with redefining the truth and challenge the privileged position of social 
scientific knowledge as its starting point to criticize the ‘rationalism’ and ‘truth’ 
of the system.
Critical theory’s understanding of social theory defines it as something 
that is “not true or false simply by virtue of its ability to give an accurate 
account of the facts of the world, but rather by virtue of its ability to show the
43 ibid, p.259
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social agent how their belief and self-'.:nderstandings partially constitute those 
facts’’^ .
The main task of critical theory is to bring the self -  liberation of the 
social agent (both individual and society) from these predetermined facts, 
through defining misunderstandings and projecting a new alternative. Since, 
the main task of critical theory is to change the system it must offer intellectual 
tools that can be empowered to realize this release. However, “critical theory 
would be confirmed when it assisted its addressees in recognizing their ability
to make their own history',1.45
In analyzing the relation between critical theory and political practices, 
the starting point shall be figuring out the addressee of the theory. According 
to Bernstein “critical theory acknowledges no revolutionary agent, they present 
a revolutionary theory in a non-revolutionary age, in this account critical theory 
presents a paradox'"’®. On the other hand Adorno continued to defend the 
importance of critical theory stating “ ... those are the bottles thrown into the 
sea for the future addressees'"’ .^
Habermas clarifies the concept of addressee by remarking;
“What today separates us from Marx are evident historical truths, 
for example, in the development of capitalist society there is no identifiable 
class, no social group that can be singled out as the representatives of a 
general interest that has been violated. That insight separates us from the 
oider generation of Frankfurt School"'’®.
Stephen T. Leonard, Critical Theory in Practise, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
1990. p.4 
ibid. p.40 
ibid, p.44 
ibid, p.44 
ibid, p.46
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The theory has such an important mission of assisting its addressees to 
make their own histories and enable to change the system. It may be argued 
that the addressee of the critical theory is the society which is in need of 
formulating its cultural-identity and looking for a way-out of the domination of 
the system.
Critical theory stands on two Important pillars;
ii)
“Social evolution is a process through which technical and cultural learning 
is released into developmental trajectories and stabilized in organizational 
and productive forms, where it takes on regulative functions”
“System of regulations are subject to crisis and generates social 
movements which offer alternative organizational solutions”
Habermas’ theory questions how to theorize the effects of 
modernization in societies which could not adopt themselves to the 
developmental stages of the West like Turkey.
According to Habermas, the form of modernization is distorted and 
“pathologies result from the disintegration of community, rupture of traditional 
and loss of meaning as a consequence of which individuals preserve their 
identity only by means of defensive strategy” ®^,
Habermas places the dislocation of traditional relations at the center of 
his theory and he regards Islamic traditionalism as a permanent opposition to
See, “Introduction” in Lany J. R ay, Rethinking Cultural Theory. Sage Publications, London, 1993. 
ibid, p. 130
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modernity. Because, traditional and defensive movements do displace what 
Habermas calls “the melancholic longing for irretrievable pasts”®\
This inevitable resistance eventually divides modernizing societies into 
two poles; one group conceives tradition as a continuous counter-weight to 
modernization. The other emphasizes the importance of traditional social 
values.
This problem area is dominated and structured by a single way of 
thinking and a single truth of the West. Critical theory seeks a resolution and 
looks for a break out of this vicious circle by changing minds and creating new 
types of social relations.
To change a society, “critical theory requires a detailed insight of what 
binds the society together. Only through an analytical exploration of the 
integration process critical theory can propose a realistic solution.
So, it is time to evaluate critical theory’s conceptualizations about the 
social realities and integrations of modern society. Above all everything we 
shall discuss reason, as it is the soul that shapes everything concerning 
modern thought.
David Cauzens Hoy summarizes the insight that shapes modern 
enlightenment with a brilliant sentence “The sleep of reason produce;,.:
ibid. p.l31
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monsters”®^. This short judgement perfectly put forwards what modern 
enlightenment and dynamics shaping society thinks about the reason; 
“Reason is not simply a light opposed to the darkness fantasy, but has its own 
dark-sides”®^. That reason forces us to believe in a unique idea of truth, 
conceive history as the narrative of progress, criticize other cultures with its 
own holly criteria.
Critical theory tries to make a critical reconstruction of enlightenment 
conception of reason and rational subject, as they influenced and shaped 
cultural representations. Cultural representation is about creating identity and 
defining self actually; “cultural representation helps form the images they have 
of others; if assimilated by those others, they influence the images they have 
of themselves as well; they get embodied in institutions and inform policies 
and practices"®" .^ This asymmetry of representation thus enacted and 
reproduced the asymmetry of power®®.
This asymmetry is produced by economic, political and cultural 
inefficiencies and reproduced through two important devices that were 
instrumentalized by modernizing societies; hyperreality and simulation. 
Modernization is a process which tries to produce transnational communities 
that are all alike and represent a kind of mono-culture. This is an assumption 
which can be made real with hyperrealities that would work on behalf of power 
and ideology deepening the asymmetry. And, in return, “these abstract frames
David Couzens Hoy and Thomas Me Cartliy, Critical Theory, Blackwell, Massachussets, 1994, p. 1 
ibid, p.4 
ibid, p.86
R.Collins and M.Makowski, op.cit, p.88
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of the real increasingly functions in ordinary consciousness as simulations”®®. 
According to Baudrillard, “simulations are the generation by models of real 
without origin or reality; hyperreal”®^.
The end product of such a process is inevitably the nostalgic assuming 
full meaning, back to the past, traditions. Then this schizoid crack within the 
society brings in “powerful states agencies to normalize individual and mass 
behaviour among the subject population through police, school, bureaucracy 
and military”®®. This theoretical outlook is a perfect map to evaluate Turkish 
modernization; where political power tries to mobilize the subject population 
through hyperreality. It, further, enforced simulations promising development 
and Westernization, but finally end up with creating a divided society, those 
who internalized the motivation through the ends of political power, and those 
who are looking for more reality.
In this terrain what can we do with critical theory? “Critical theory is a 
way of seeing and a form of knowing that employs historical knowledge, 
reflexive reasoning and ironic awareness to give people some tools to realize 
new potentials for emancipation and enlightenment of ordinary individuals 
today® .^ Critical theory can be used to disclose the power and domination in 
modern society. Critical theory can be helpful in guiding the subject population 
to realize a greater enlightenment.
Philip Wexler, Critical Theory Now, Palmer Press, London, 1991, p.3 
ibid, p.3 
^Sbid p.l2  
ibid p .21
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The greater enlightenment for the Turkish society at the margins of 
European Union would be, to eventually solve its eternal identity crisis and 
end up with a consensus and a synthesis of its cultural heritage forming 
concept of Turkish identity. Neither only Eastern nor only Western but 
something really Turk’. Turks have to merge all the components of their 
cultural map, through a synthesis, which would put forward the real Turkish 
identity. This could not be done alone with constitution or state discourse, this 
needs a collective sharing which would create collective consciousness, the 
inner dynamics of a society seeking consensus could be the initiator for the 
internalization of the synthesis.
Habermas’ contributions to the cultural dimension of critical theory and 
especially his communicative action theory are very significant. Habermas 
conceives culture as an external phenomenon to the individual. Accordingly, 
an individual can learn to be a member of the society only through subjective 
internalization.
This study also examines culture as an external phenomenon for both 
individual and society. Because, "legitimation is a tangible product of culture 
which bears on the decision-making capacities of the state’’®°. This perception 
breaks through the limits of conceiving culture as merely a set of norms 
values. According to Habermas, the problem of legitimation “involves the 
dynamic interaction of social classes, class fraction, prophetic and messianic
“  Bergesen “Habermas and Critical Theory” in Watlirow, Hunter, Bergesen, Kurzweil (eds) Culture 
and Critical Theory, Routledge, London, 1984. p.205.
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movements and state agencies”®’ . In the Turkish case, this legitimation of the 
power of culture was used by the states elites to create a modern and 
homogenous society, but ended up with a divided society.
Rather, these groups are making claims on legitimation. According to 
Habermas, these claims are made through “language”. To account for 
language or symbolic interaction from the point of view of critical theory, 
Habermas developed an ideal type of speaking, and conceptualized it as the 
theory of communicative action “Theory of communicative action is critical 
about the reality of developed societies that they do not make full use of their 
learning potential culturally available to them, but deliver themselves over to 
an uncontrolled complexity. This outflanks traditional forms of life.
This very nature of modern societies created scarcities in meaning and 
the left individual alone, searching for identity and ways of social interaction. 
Habermas’ two-sided concept of modernity points to a resolution in one of two 
directions: “towards increasingly participating, decentralized and fluid 
modernization or toward repressive modernization, minimizing the scope of 
public sphere activity”®®
The problem of repressive state was put forward most clearly by the 
Frankfurt School in their critique of enlightenment, “That is, modernity 
fragments the substantive restrains of tradition, norms and institutions
ibid, p.208. ^
William Outliwaite, “Critical Social Tlieory Today” m The Habermas Reader, Polity Press,
Cambridge, 1996, p.310.
L. J. Ray op.cit. p.l72.
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therefore the core identity of the system protects itself against the politics to 
which it gave rise”®'’.
Critical theory seeks new bases for integration and communication 
through participatory institutions. The vitality of critical theory in the domain of 
cultural studies is most evident in its “capacity to respond to historical 
transformation and critically appropriate emergent currents of thinking”®®.
This theoretical insight is going to be used to explain the basis of 
sufferings in a society that is experiencing the transition from “pre-modern”! to 
“modern" under the premises of Orientalism and modernity. Because, this 
transition bring about a challenge on the existing norms, values and 
codifications about culture that is framing the traditional identity
^ ib id . p.l73  
Wexler, op.cit. p.29
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CHAPTER 2:
THE ORIENT’S “WEST”? and / or THE WEST’S “ORIENT”?
“We want equality which does not force us to 
accept an identity, but at the same time we want 
difference which is not degenerated as superiority or 
inferiority.”
Todorov
Personal identification rests upon signs produced within a certain 
culture. A scarf, beard, long hair, a tattoo, a leather jacket, a collar on the 
neck, a turban or solely a color (red, green, black) may provide a 
representation for the individual. What matters is in the countries passing 
through a transition period, going back and forth between traditional and 
modern, these innocent identifiers are becoming a matter of life or death. 
Intolerance has reached such a climax, that people started killing each other 
for the signs chosen for representation. The barman who was killed in Istanbul 
(Oguz Atak), in May 1997, because of his intolerable tattoo, which was 
representing God’s name “Allah”, is the proof of the fragile peace between the 
two divided sections of the Turkish society; secularists and Islamists. The 
massacres in Algeria, the totalitarian system in Iran and unrest in all the other 
Third World countries is the result of modernization attempts as the radical 
retreat from cultural roots which fell under the spell of “Orientalism”.
The current circumstances throughout the Third World is forcing us to 
study ‘identity crisis’ created by modernization. As Homi Bhabha points out, it 
is a created agenda; “This is not our chosen agenda, the terms of the debate
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had been set for us, but in the midst of the culture wars and the canon 
manouver we can hardly hide behind the aprons of a priori and protest 
historically that there is nothing outside the text”®®. Societies and individuals 
exist with the value system with which they chose to be identified. Indeed an 
individual’s peaceful existence and coexistence depends on social collective 
consciousness, which is the product of an encompassing historical 
development. It is the overall memory of a nation, both comprising its past and 
future, creating a value system and its traditions, advocating, pertain roles to 
certain individuals to be fulfilled, framing the horizons of a certain national 
identity.
Having different historical and social backgrounds, each nation 
developed a collective identity of its own. However, historical differences 
sometimes enabled certain cultures to be the ruling power and the producer of 
the collectivity on behalf of others. The imagined geography of “our-land” and 
“barbarian-land” (other’s-land) occupying social, cultural, ethical boundaries, 
created a discourse on the Orient and defined a cultural identity for them from 
the perspective of the Occident. This rational hegemony of knowledge also 
showed the East how to modernize and develop in order to be accepted as an 
actor in the ruling international system.
However , Western claims to create a modernized East and adoptive 
actors to the ruling international system created serious responses against the 
Western discourse of modernization and rationalization. Because, in these 
societies the process of identification had been interrupted by the
^  Hoini Bhabha, The Location o f Culture, Routledge, London, 1994, p. 53.
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modernization attempts and peace among individuals has been upset with 
new and alien concepts, norms, and values to their collective consciousness.
Such an argument is not against modernization attempts or Western 
culture, because first of all the East and West are not binary oppositions. But 
to understand the identity crisis in the Orient one has to question the 'Western 
impositions on the East’ and ‘modernization attempts of the East’. Because, 
such an analysis underlines the factors which had created ‘dual identities’ in 
those societies and the factors which created individuals seeking for an unified 
‘identity’.
This chapter will work through the problématique in two sections. In the 
first part, we will analyze how the identity crisis in the East had been created 
throughout history, why people started asking ‘Who are we?’, and how 
modernization turned out to be a threat against values. The relation between 
the East and West is based upon a comparison starting with their first 
encounter. The foremost element which they had compared in early history 
was their ‘religions’. The comparison was among “Christ and Muhammad’’®^. 
Later, during the colonial period, the subjects of comparison were civilization 
and reason. This paved the way for the Oriental discourse and modernization 
theory. The second part of the paper will be an analysis of the Turkish society 
which is passing through a transition period and is experiencing identity crisis.
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PART1 
Who are we?
Time is a Circle
Albert Hourani dates the first encounter as the early days of Islam®®. 
According to Hourani, Christians started to identify Christ as “Christ is 
everything which Mohammed is not”®®. When Islam had start to be challenge 
as a political entity.
Shayegan brings these two experiences together; according to him the 
Islamic World met twice with the West throughout history. In the first meeting 
they “glorified Western innovation” ®^ and admired their civilization. However, in 
the second one, they stacked into an “obsessive hysteria” and “refusal’’^^ The 
flourishing new realities created a tension and paved the way to the formation 
to a clash of values of collective consciousness with new impositions. The 
Eastern subjects of colonialism start to struggle with the collective 
consciousness and with the new attractive but altering structures. Because, he 
or she was busy with filling the gaps between the borrowed values and its 
social realities and usually was unsuccessful in matching them, and accusing 
the West for this catastrophe.
Albert Hourani, “Batı Düşüncesinde İslam”, İstanbul, Sannal, 1994, p.27 
ibid, p.27
William Connolly, Kimlik, Farklılık ve Siyaset, [Identity/Difference], İstanbul, Aynntı, p.4 
™ Daryush Slıayegan, Yaralı Bilinç [Le Regard Mutile], İstanbul, Mets, 1991, p .ll .  
’’ ib id p .ll
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Examining the relations of so called East and West on the basis of 
encounters one can end up finding out different concepts for comparison. In 
the first encounter the concept under consideration was ‘religion’ (The Muslim 
Turks had challenged Christian hegemony over the Mediterranean Sea and 
economic dissatisfaction showed its face blaming religious incompatibility and 
making religion as a scapegoat). In the second encounter; when West was 
ready to challenge Ottomans economically, socially and culturally during the 
enlightenment era, the comparison was made on the basis of civilization and 
reason. This marked the sharp division between the two poles; modern and 
non-modern. This polarisation helped to identify a society by then, using the 
tools of modernity and reason.
However, the centuries long hegemony of the West is about to end. 
Because the East started a counter-attack against Western discourse. They 
started to question Western claims on their civilization. This move was the end 
of the circle. Once more, the comparison was to be made, taking religion into 
account. Religion has always been the most important element for 
comparison, because it is one of the most important elements that created a 
civilization and socialization, it is the determinant of social, cultural, political 
texture of a nation.
Religion is one of the deep rooted normative structures of society that 
spread into every sphere of social life. It is impossible to carve its influence 
out. However, sometimes religion lost its in importance comparing and 
defining the two societies, as reason and progress had been the motor of
modernization. But, it never vanished from the scene. And again it is ‘religions’ 
turn to take place in the play.
The spiral circle defining time, now ended in the 1990s taking religion 
back into the scene. This is not a surprise and its coming back in the future 
would not be either. Because, it is the determinant of the social texture and 
protector of traditions. As Niyazi Berkes put forward “religion is the last castle
of tradition«72
We will proceed with a sequenced pattern that analyses how the “circle” 
was filled; how Western identity was produced, looking through the Orient, 
how the Orient was Orientalized, and how they were forced to create an 
identity of their own in a “reactive” way.
Once, the West and East had only been been geographical categories, 
but now they ceased from being solely geographical categories, and gained a 
dual identity. They represent a type of society, life style, civilization and 
culture. What made them gain such a dual identity is a process led by Western 
societies to identify themselves.
Keyman states that, these categories were conceptualized according 
to a Center, that is “East, West, Near, Far” were created from a center. 
However, this center did not conceive the other part as a different culture, but
Niyazi Berkes, Türk Düşüncesinde Batı Sorunu, Bilgi Yay. Ankara 1973, 17.
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introduced this different culture as a “culture which is radically different from 
West that is less civilized, exotic and fantastic”^^ .
Again according to Keyman, this center had been created by a “Power 
relation that had been determined by economic and political relations between 
East and West” "^*. And this power game works through language; “one pole of 
the opposition, always identified with deficiency so the superiority of the other 
pole became clear”^^ . What enables language being so effective is the 
“meaning” that, it attributed to signs and signifiers. According to Saussure “it’s 
the difference between black and white which enables these words to carry
meaning .76
The West while it identified East, instrumentalized Western structure 
and through that comparison, placed all the societies which are non-western 
into a “special different system”^^  radically putting them into the category of the 
“other” like a child who is trying to construct a self image through evilizing 
others. National cultures acquired their sense of identity by comparing 
themselves with others.
Taking this relation into account, we can say that it is hard to separate 
the development of identification process of the Eastern and Western 
civilizations. Mirroring Orient’s image, the West found its identity, simply as the 
"West was what the Orient is not”. According to Hall, “ West and East are the
”  Fuat Kevinan, Orientalizm, Hegemonya ve Kültürel Fark, İletişim, İstambul 1996, p.lO 
ibid p. 10 
ibid p.lO
Stuart Hall, Questions o f Cultural Identity, London, Sage, 1996, p. 279.
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two different sides of the same coin... The so called uniqueness of West was 
produced by European’s self comparison with other non- Western societies” ®^.
Shortly, the West is a complex generalization “produced by a certain 
historical process operating in a particular place, in unique historical 
circumstances”^^ . The emergence of an idea of West is central to 
enlightenment, and “hammered by the challenge of Islam”, brought Europe 
together as a family, against a world which is different from them.
The difference between the West and East represented by a discourse 
provided a language for Western hegemony of knowledge. Discourse being 
knowledge, and power through language has become a Western instrument to 
control and dominate the rest of the world. Hall stated “When statements 
about a topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse makes it 
possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the other ways in 
which the topic can be constructed”®®. All of the statements work together to 
form, according to Foucault, “Discursive formation, they refer to the same 
object, share the same style, and support a strategy with common institutions 
and patterns”®\ Within the boundaries of this unquestioned formation, 
knowledge became power and power produced knowledge
If we examine the relation between the East and West according to the 
Foucaultian term “regime of truth”, we end up with “one of the best examples.
”  Keyman, op.cit., p. 11 
Hall, op.cit. p.279.
79 ;vibid p.278. 
ibid, p.291
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provided by Edward Said in “Orientalism". Said defines Orientalism as a 
“Western style of domination, restructuring and having authority over the 
Orient”®^
Said says “ I study Orientalism as a dynamic exchange between 
individual authors and large political concerns shaped by the three empires; 
France, Britain and America in whose intellectual, imaginative territory the 
writing was produced”. In that sense. Said accepts that Orientalism has 
become a tool that creates in its very function the hegemony through 
knowledge.
We can argue that domination works in three basic dimensions
I- European positional superiority
II- The Orient became available for Orientalization
III- None or little resistance from the Orient.
To explain what Orientalism means, these interrelated dimensions 
should be made clear: “European positional superiority puts the West in a 
whole series of possible relations with the Orient without making them losing 
the upper-hand”®^. Because, what had led their imaginative examination was 
sovereign consciousness that created their unchallenged centrality. However, 
this superiority has not been given birth to by “logic governed by empirical 
reality, but, by desires, repression, investment and projections”®"*.
ibid, p.293
Edward Said, op.cit. p.3. 
” ibid.p.7 
ibid, p.9
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Because of this domination, the Orient could never become a free 
subject. “Orientalism determined what could be said about the Orient”®^ The 
West supplied Oriental “identity, genealogy, mentality dealing with them as a 
phenomenon possesing regular character”®®. They defined those non- 
Europeans by “suppressing differences in one, inaccurate stereotype”®^. The 
Orient could be Orientalized through stereotyping. The imaginary line dividing 
these two cultures had to be crystallized by European “possessions”; 
civilization, socialization culture and institutions. These absentees in the East 
had been evaluated as a deficiency of those countries. Worse than that, these 
evaluations of West had been internalized by the East without questioning, 
without putting forward a clear cut distinction between the two societies, with 
humiliation and fear. Shortly, Orientalism could be established as a discipline 
which “is able to manage and produce the Orient politically, sociologically and 
imaginatively.”®® The last chain completing the circle and pumping out 
traditionalist tendencies and fundamentalist Islam was the production of a 
theory encompassing all these discursive formations; Orientalism and 
hegemony of knowledge.
Modernization theory rules out the international system for decades. 
That illusive promise representing the hegemony of Western knowledge 
created an artificial culture of its own with dual identities at the expense of real 
development and equality in Eastern societies. And it owes its success to
ibid, p.3
** Hall, op.cit. p.297 
Hall, op.cit, p.303. 
*** Said op.cit. p.3
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, being founded on a strong foundation that had been endured since 
enlightenment.
We will frame a descriptive outlook of modernization theory, 
emphasizing its heritage of positional superiority and Orientalist discourse 
which works through hegemony of knowledge. To begin with, there is not one 
modernization theory. Rather, this term embraces a variety of perspectives 
that were applied by non-Marxists in the 1950s and 1960s. The dominant 
theme of these perspectives were borrowed from the established sociological 
traditions and involved the reinterpretation of classical thought. Evolutionism, 
diffusionism, structural functionalism and their interactions were all combined 
and reinterpreted as Modernization theory; “it is a combination and 
reinterpretation of classical sociology, anthropology, psychology and political
science»89
In the historical analysis of the roots of modernization theory, 
“evolutionism" forms the first corner stone. According to Harrison, in many 
respects “the beginning of modernization theory can be traced back to 
antiquity, when the notion of evolutionism was first used with reference to 
human society”®°. The idea of progress has always been accepted as the 
central theme of intellectual thought. It started to be examined systematically 
in the 18'  ^ Century. Starting from the 19'*^  Century, societies were 
distinguished from one another according to their place in the evolution scale.
89 David Harrison, The Sociology o f Modernization and Development, Unwin Hyman, 1988, p.l
38
All non-Western societies admired the achievement of Western 
societies, but this went along with fear. They believed that their old system 
with its security and predictability would be swept away by this new advanced 
form of civilization.
In the opening decade of the 20‘  ^ Century “structural functionalism” 
became the dominant perspective in sociology. According to this perspective, 
“societies are self-sufficient adaptive social systems, characterized by varying 
degrees of differentiation and roles of institutions as their principle units”®\
This approach conceives “society as a system made up of a 
number of parts and subsystems and believes that the integrity of the 
whole is provided by the functional interdependence of these systems”®^. 
The nature of this interdependence is best illustrated in the works of Talcott 
Parsons. According to Parsons, all social systems must deal with four basic 
functional problems “Adaptation; which refer to the capacity of a system to 
control its environment for the purpose of achieving some goals. Goal 
attainment, referring to the need to relate system resources to the 
achievement of goals. Interaction, deals with the problem of maintaining 
cohesion between the units of the system. Latency refers to the imperative 
of maintaining a stable value system and dealing with problems of 
motivation”®^ .
The West had placed ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ as a binary opposition, a 
society can not be both. Their conflictuary coexistence would lead to social 
disturbance. This proved to be true in modernizing countries. Adaptation 
problems, losing the predictability of their traditional security created an 
identity crisis in those societies. All the societies that had fallen under the spell 
of modernization are now experiencing different kinds of social disturbances.
^  ibid, p.3 
’’ ibid, p.7
Vicky Randall, Political Change and Development, Durham, NC, New York University Press, 1985
p.16
”  ibid. p .l6
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Turkey is no exception. The second part will evaluate the crisis created by 
modernization attempts in Turkey.
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PART 2
Internalised Orientalism and the Results of Inevitable Modernisation in 
Turkey:
By now I discussed about the theoretical structure of the relations that 
had been formed between East and West. The theoretical background of the 
relations between the two, dominated this study, because I believe that; to 
understand the inherent dynamics ruling the social economic and cultural 
relations between Turkey and West. It has to be made clear to make 
evaluations about present position of European Union considering Turkey and 
Turkey considering European Union.
Turkey’s longing for being a part of Europe (West) is not a new policy of 
Republican governments, it is a traditional foreign policy of both Ottoman 
Empire and Turkish Republican governments. I will not make a detailed 
historical evaluation of the relations that shaped this longing, but 1 believe it 
would make sense to focus on modernisation attempts of Turkey which 
accelerated the longing and added new dynamics to the relations between the 
two.
In the glorious days of the Ottoman Empire, Ottomans over-looked 
Europe as they did to the rest of the world. Ottoman Empire was confident, 
snobbish and believed that it had the upper hand in the relations with Europe. 
When their claim of being a World Empire had been challenged in the period
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of decline, they tried to form a more realistic worldview considering some new 
aspects of the changing world order and technology. Ottomans believed that 
their technological inferiority was responsible of their inferiority, and once it is 
supplied, they would be able to take a position in the power struggle again.
This is a period that started with the attempts of modernisation of the 
army in 1730s by Mahmut I and carried out by Abdulhamit I in 1770s, then by 
Selim III ini780s, Mahmut II added an administrative and political dimension 
to these attempts by declaration of Regulations in 1809.
The period started with regulations which is ruled by enlightened 
despotism. The founder of regulations tried to activate the daily culture of 
Western civilisation within Ottoman territories together with the revolutionary 
changes they made in the realms of military and administrative structures.
Reactions to these novelties started to be shaped in the same period; 
the Young Ottomans triggered the pillar first. “The representatives of Young 
Ottomans like Namik Kemal, Ziya Pasha accused reformists for denying their 
culture and chasing away from Sharia rule”®'*. According to Mardin the period 
of Abdulhamid 11 (1876-1909) was the period in which West was understood 
fully and truly. “Abdulhamid II had modelled West adopting technical, 
administrative and military innovations, but at the same time he was trying to 
strengthen the Islamic culture and rule of Islam among the Muslim 
population”®^.
’‘*Şerif Mardin, Türk Modernleşilesi, Makaleler 4, İletişim Yayınlan, İstanbul 1991, p.l5  
ibid. p. 17
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The counter attack against modernisation-tradition had been down 
graded into religion. However one shall not forget that “religion has played 
varied roles for different groups of people, Islam of the ruler, is not the islam of 
the ruled. Religion often justified rather than determined politics”. S o  it would 
not be wrong to argue that religion under the label of and protection of identity 
turned out to be a vital weapon in the hands of politicians and other power 
groups.
According to critical theory nature of modernisation creates scarcities in 
meaning, which had been introduced as a result of historical transformations 
and inability of fully using the cultural potential, that are available for a society. 
Habermas regards islamic tradition as a permanent opposition to modernity, a 
melancholic longing for the past. Because, hyperrealities and simulations 
strengthens the scarcities in meaning and accelerates search for a true 
identity and Turks are at the margins, of European Union with that basic 
impulse claiming to find their 'true identity’.
98 ibid, p.5
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CHAPTER 3:
THE DILEMMA OF CULTURAL IDENTITY CONSIDERING TURKEY AND 
EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS:
The evaluation of Turkey’s longing for full membership to the European 
Union solely on the basis of pressures of globalisation or search for a strong 
economic partnership or reliant military alliance is not realistic and does not 
frame the full outlook to understand the relation between the two. The implicit, 
but most important criterion is Turkey’s search for an identity.
Neither the Ottoman Empire nor the Turkish Republic identified itself 
with the East. Both of them tended to be associated with the West. The former 
made this longing explicit through trying to take a geographical position and 
later tried to take a political and institutional position. What was intrinsic in the 
attempts of the Turks for centuries was their persistence to take a place on the 
Western end of the pendulum. The deep and irresistible impact of internalised 
orientalism left no choice for the Turks other than denying being a part of the 
“irrational East”. Moreover, Turks introduced the East as the binary opposition, 
“the other”, to be used in identity formation.
On the other hand, Europe never conceived the “Turks” as a member of 
their community. Actually the Turkish identity was associated with the East 
and had become “the other” in shaping identity. So, the schizoid crack 
between the two partners on the macro level shall be the starting point in 
analysing their relation because, the wounded conscious of Turkey introduces
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its membership to European Union as a matter of life and death. It is 
perceived as the last chance to be a part of the European map, identity and 
culture. European resistance further motivates this longing.
In the words of Cağlar Keyder, "of all the countries at the parameters of 
the European Union, the problematic of inclusion or exclusion presents the 
greatest identity dilemma for Turkey”^^ . Turks had to face the difficult problem 
of experienced and imposed otherness while other Eastern and Southern 
European applicants can be hold in harmony with the European Union with 
their Christian background.
One need to analyse the identity formation of the two parties in relation 
with each other throughout history.
Çağlar Keyder, “Dilemma of Cultural Identity at tlie Margins of the European Union” Review, XVI, 
1, Winter. 1993, p .l9
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PART 1
Historical Relations between Turkey and Europe:
A) The Making of European Identity:
There are various elements that make European identity, but they can 
be examined under three headings. The first one is geo-historical face of 
Europe. Second, can be summarised as the internal and external challenges 
that Europe faces. And finally, is the most powerful dimension sustaining 
consensus about European identity, which is the presence of ‘the otheh.
Bekemans had brought the geo-historical faces of
- Mythical Europe.
- Harmonious Europe.
- Geographical and Historical Europe.
- Stereotype Europe.
These titles are all used by Bekemans to explain Europe’s diversity, 
coherence and unique civilisation that is characterised by a specific geo- 
historical context, basic values of freedom, solidarity and common cultural 
heritage, intellectual and artistic history. Bekemans’ faces of Europe refer to a 
single assembly unit, ‘culture’. “Culture as a set of values, norms and patterns 
influencing behaviour through a process of institutionalisation’’ °^°.
The institutionalisation of culture in the historical framework is actually 
the building block of European identity. European identity is a group identity, a
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collective consciousness that was shaped by language, religion, ethnic 
commonalities and symbols and history.
N. Yurdusev analysing the building blocks of European culture and 
identity in Turkey and Europe tries to find which element was the most 
powerful and determining throughout history. According to him European 
identity does not have a geographical stand. Geographically speaking 
Southern, Northern and Western ends of the European map was drawn by 
natural boundary lines, but the Eastern boundary had always been an issue of 
discussion and always had been determined politically. Likewise, ethnic 
pressure on European identity is another sceptical issue according to N. 
Yurdusev, as there are various ethnic groups living in Europe. He does not 
introduce language as a binding unit, but enforces the importance of religion 
above everything else with a quotation from Eliot “A new union could only rise 
on the strong foundation of oldest roots” °^^
We can talk about religion while referring the oldest roots because, 
“Europe gains a political identification with the Holy Roman Empire when its 
relation with Christianity was sealed”’°^ . Until the Modern Era religion was the 
only element that determined the identity of European societies. They were 
identified with Christianity, not with their European identity. Secularism, 
swiping away the church’s authority gives another definition to Europe, a new 
political and cultural meaning in addition to Christianity.
ibid.p.4
Yurdusev in Atilla Eralp. rwrA'/ye ve Avrupa, İmge, Ankara, 1997, p.33
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According to Yurdusev, Europe started to be identified as a civilisation 
with “the expansion of its borders, when it was introduced to the other”’ °^ .
It would not be wrong to argue that, the geo-historical faces of Europe 
was shaped with relation to ‘the other’ and was defended against 'the other’. 
Another factor that brought Europe together is the external and internal 
challenges, which implicates European unity and diversity. Those challenges 
may be classified as;
Politically exaggerated carefulness of Europe in international conflicts.
A process of European integration with deepening and widening aspects. 
The identity issue as a basis for inter-cultural communication.'“
Facing these three important challenges Europe has to keep up its 
unity; to counter-balance the strength of The United States of America in 
international conflicts, to create its own community, where it can create a 
sphere of influence putting forward its own rules to survive as an identity 
where identity issues are accepted as the basis of inter-cultural 
communication.
Finally, Europe is trying to form a unified and coherent identity against 
the other, because the presence of the other is the only source for a unified 
European identity.
As said before “European international society historically depended on 
a deeper consensus, an agreement on domestic values of social and cultural
ibid, p.35 
ibid. p.45.
104I. B. Neumiuin and Welslp “Tlie Otlier in European self-definition; an addendum to tlie literature on 
international society” \n Review o f Internationa! Studies. 1991, 17, p.325.
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nature. It is the us versus them group consciousness”. W i t h  that insight 
European sates refreshed their own identity as a cultural whole and were able 
to create their own community to play their interstate game.
One perspective of history was strongly shaped in the 19**^  century in 
the period of European imperialism. Because of the shadow cast by the 
century regime of truth we strongly overlook the ways in which Europe in its 
development has been standing on the shoulders of other cultures.
B) Turkish Modernisation and Mapping of Turkish Identity:
The Turks moved into the orbit of Europe gradually “first as a strong 
and superior enemy, then as an ally, and finally as a depended client in order 
to ward off Russian threat” °^®. In the process they tried to be modernised to 
retain their independence and adopted Western values.
The Turks are unique among the Muslim people for having openly 
accepted Modernisation in its European dress as a state policy. Theirs is the 
first example in the long encounter between the East and West. The reason is 
clear; historically the Ottoman Empire was the enemy of Europe, but the 
Empire accepted the validity of Modernity in the early 19‘  ^century.
“The Ottoman rulers came to see themselves as having to cope with an 
underdeveloped country, it did not have a chance of resurgence based on 
its own resources and culture, but needed to import wholesale all the 
institutions and ideas to characterise modernity and progress”
ibid p.328
V. Mastny and C. Nation “Turks Between East and West” in V. Mastny and C. Nation (eds) 
Turkey Between East and West, Westview Press. 1996, p.37.
107 Keyder, op.cit. p.25
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This led to unquestionable equation of modernisation with the West. 
The reason behind this motivation is the non-existence of a governing culture 
in the Ottoman political and slate tradition which could cope with the problems 
of the 19"^  century, which could bind the population under a single political and 
cultural identity.
At the margins of European Union Turkey is still suffering from this 
problematic issue of ‘coping’ with and ‘adaptation’ to a historically different 
understanding of government or ‘governing’ which contributes to a very 
complicated issue, i.e, Turkish Modernization. Because, from the very 
beginning, Turkey’s European Union policies were under the deep impact of 
modernisation and Westernisation concerns. The inheritors of Republicans 
that enforces modernisation from above want to use the application for the full 
membership to European Union at the last pione. This last lunge will give 
Turkey a legitimate position within the Turkish society and international society 
with a European identity.
However this elitist motive like the other phases of Modernisation 
attempts by the intellectual elites had to counterbalance the opposition from 
three different groups. According to C. Keyder’s Matrix, the opposition can be 
classified (taking their political discourse into account) as:
1) Anti-Modernist, Anti-V/esternisation block; Fundamentalist Islamists, 
had political representation with the Welfare Party.
2) Modernist-Anti Westernisation blocks which found its political 
representation in three different groups; the Marxist left, Traditionalist 
Islamists, Nationalist right.
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3) Modernists-Pro-Westernisation block; which is represented by the right
wing, liberal political parties and social democrats. 108
The strongest opposition finds voice in the discourse of Islamic 
Fundamentalism that is represented by the Welfare Party. The prominent 
figure of the party Erbakan put forward his party’s position vis-à-vis European 
Union in one of his speeches.
"European Union was established by six Western European states 
aiming at union among them, an framework unsuitable for Turkey. 
Turkey's social structure is totally different from them. Most of the 
states in European Union are Catholic and a minority Protestant; the 
Jews in particular wish to use the European Union to ensure their 
ruling the world, and the free masons have similar plans. Had Turkey 
joined, it would have been a minority and its sovereignty would have 
suffered. Hence it is more natural for Turkey to join a common market
.inQ
of Muslim states""'.
This political attitude is another dimension of the crack within the 
Turkish society, which shows its affect in every aspect of the social political 
and cultural life. And which could pave way to a catastrophe with the further 
push from each party.
Ç. Keyder Ulusal Kalkınmacılığm İflasıMsûs, İstanbul, 1993, pp.35-36 
Necmettin Erbakan, Türkiye ve Ortak Pazar, İzmir, 1971.
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PART 2
Formation and Formulation of The European Union.
A) Historical Foundations of European Union.
Besides the presence of ‘the other’ in the formulation of European 
identity, carving out collective consciousness and shared memory would also 
be helpful. Their unpleasant past was economically, socially and religiously 
interactive in giving shape to the Modern European system.
This interaction first worked through paving way to the reformulation of 
legitimacy and political power creating the new subject that would present 
sovereignty after the Thirty Years War between Catholics and Protestants 
ending with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The political power of Roman 
Catholic Church diminished and the concept of sovereignty had been first 
defined on the parameters of equality of sovereign states.
The sovereign and equal kings enjoyed power until the 1789 French 
Revolution. Napoleon was the prominent figure of the period, but he turned out 
to be an aggressor trying to unify Europe under his own leadership. The 
Vienna Congress of 1815 made a contract on ‘Balance of Power’ which would 
suppress other aggressors. However, this system was challenged in the 20*'^  
century with the First World War. This time international society tried to stop 
further aggression with the creation of ‘League of Nations’ introducing the 
concept of ‘collective securit/’.
53
The last challenge with The Second World War proved the 
ineffectiveness of such organisations and the world noticed that reason of 
wars was apparently economic and they should threat the causes to stop the 
wars. The Europeans had understood that they should create economic 
partnership and make calculations on economic cooperation.
The post 1945 order politically shaped the sphere of influence for 
mainly two rivals; the United States of America and the Soviet Union Such a 
re-shaping gave a new dynamism to economic cooperation under the 
leadership of The United States of America with the implementation of the 
Marshall Plan. More importantly this re-shaping of power balance has led to 
the emergence of NATO as a military alliance.
Shortly, after the Second World War the theory of functionalism 
managed to find practical implementation with its claim; “economic 
cooperation will stop the wars”. The first step of the unification had been 
realised along with functionalist parameters under the Paris Treaty in 1951. 
France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Holland, the original six, came 
together by the establishment of Coal and Steel Community. The idea was to 
enable cooperation in a single sector then expand it in the parameters of 
economic, political and social relation by the spill over effect. In 1957 by the 
Rome Treaty to counterbalance the other nuclear powers, they came together 
to create EURATOM.
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This newborn political economic entity verified some of the expectations 
of the functionalists, but nullify most of the others. Spill over effect expected to 
take place automatically by functionalists, but needed many structural 
foundations. The capacities of these newly formed bodies proved that neo 
functionalist enforcement on a supranational body is needed. The true 
integration could only be possible in the presence of a supranational body with 
its economic, political, social and cultural dimensions.
In 1967, in The Treaty of Merger, the framework in which the European 
Union would emerge was established. The present drive is to enable to free 
movement of service, people, capital and goods among member states and 
establish common trade barriers against non-members. The future projection 
shows the establishment of a political unification. Yamakoglu lists the motives 
behind the motivation for unification as follows:
1) To stop wars.
2) To eliminate economic boundries.
3) To improve living standards.
4) To use resources efficiently.
5) To make political cooperation and have a say in the international arena.
6) To sustain peace all around the world.
7) To control Germany under the shelter of The European Union.
8) To establish an international system which is ruled by laws.
Then comes the question; “who could be a part in realising such aims?” 
“What are the criteria to have the membership?” Ambassador Michael Lake 
summarises the criteria such as;
1) Protection of minorities, human rights, rule of law and democracy.
Cihan YainakogliL Turkler Yine Avrupada, Akçağ Yayınlan. Ankara, 1993, p.l2
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2) The presence of market economy and ability to compete within the 
European market.
3) The applicant should obey the rules of European Union in every
sphere; political, economic and monetary. 111
B) Relations between Turkey and European Union:
A Historical Perspective
Between 1923-1945 Turks followed a neutral foreign policy as they 
stabilised their new state. After The Second World War, faced with Soviet 
threat and gave up neutrality to apply newly emerging European 
organisations. This endeavour was partly successful. Turkey became a 
member of OECD in 1948, then joined Council of Europe in 1949 and NATO 
in 1952. Finally applied for full membership in the European Union to take an 
unchallengeable position in Europe.
Meltem Müftüler summarises the motives behind this culmination as;
1) Orientation to West.
2) Enlargement of trade and economic growth.
3) Turkey made its application sixteen days after Greece’s, because 
Turkey's traditionai foreign policy is structured on monitoring Greece,
so that it cannot use economic and poiitical power against Turkey. 112
In 1963 Ankara Agreement opened the doors of European Union for 
Turkey, ensuring a continuous improvement of theTurkish economy which
“Avrupa Birliği -  Türkiye İlişkileri; Bugünü ve Yannı, Güncel Avrupa , sayı; 3-4, Avrupa 
Komisyonu Türkiye Temsilciliği Yayınlan, Mart-Mayıs 1997, p.3
' Meltem Müftüler. “Turkey and European Union; Tİıe Never Ending Story, Middle Eastern Studies, 
Vol.34, Issue 4, October 1998, p. 32
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would enable competence between Turkey and member countries. “The 
mechanism of European Union and Turkey Association Agreement consisted 
of three stages that would lead to Customs Union and then an eventual full
membership.
1) Preparatory Stage: Estimated to take five to nine years and 
included introduction of tariff quotas for four major Turkish 
agricultural goods and hundred and seventy five million ECU in 
loans.
2) Transitional Stage; Supposed to prolonged twelve to twenty 
years preparing both of the sides for Customs Union.
3) Final Stage; This stage would become operative only when 
Turkey is ready for full membership. Final stage will Involve full 
application of Customs Union by allying Turkey’s tax system to 
community and integrating Turkey within common Agricultural
Policy. 113
The preparatory stage started in 1964 concluded in 1970, then 
“negotiations on the transitional stage centred on three main issues”.
1) The quality of Turkey’s agricultural and industrial goods in 
European Union markets.
2) Conditions of Turkish workers in Europe.
3) Financial aid that would be given to Turkey during the
114transitional stage.
Additional Protocol was the initiator of the second stage. The ultimate 
aim was to adopt Customs Union by December 1995, which meant; providing 
free access to Turkey’s industrial and agricultural goods into the European 
market and decrease in Turkey’s tariffs on European imports.
Both internal and external crises of1970s influenced this process. “Italy 
and France raised strong opposition to offering Turkey more generous 
agricultural concessions’’^ T h a t  made Turkey question the validity of tiT? 
protocol. The second problem was the “European Union’s Mediterranean
ibid. p.33. 
ibid, p.34
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policy, Turkey did not receive any priority over other Mediterranean
countries”^ F in a lly ,  external problems paved the way to European Union’s 
failure to carry out its promises; the 1972-1973 oil crisis, the 1974 Cyprus 
problem, in 1975 Greece’s application for full membership increased the 
tension.
The 1980 military coup in Turkey froze the relations until 1986 when 
Turgut Ozal made Turkey’s full membership a central theme of his policy and 
Turkish foreign policy. However, Turkey had lost time and the European Union 
had completed its second enlargement meanwhile.
Turkey’s official application for full membership had been made in 1987, 
but it took two years for the commission to make an evaluation on it. Finally 
reasons of rejection were explained as; Turkey’s huge population compared to 
other European countries’ populations, Turkey’s economic incapabilities, and 
Turkey’s attitude towards democracy and human rights and Turkey’s relation 
with Greece considering the Cyprus problem.
In 1990 the European Union adopted a package to develop Turkey’s 
relations with the European Union; establishing Customs Union in 1995, 
furthering technical assistance and financial and political cooperation. 
According to Müftüler, "today we can make three scenarios for the future of 
Turkey-European Union relations”.
1) Eventual membership
115 i
116 ;
ibid. p .l35  
ibid. p .l35
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2) Limiting Turkey to preferential agreements like those of Yugoslavia and 
Cyprus.
3) Turkey becomes a full member on certain policies but remain outside 
of others.
European Union’s policies concerning Turkey has a consistency, it had 
never came to the point of breaking the bounds. Thus, the European Union 
aivyays enforced partnership rather than full membership. The reason for this 
seems to be socio-political as Tekeli and İlkin say, “Turkey’s economic system 
is not suitable to that of Europeans which is working with state intervention 
without mixed-scanning system’’.” ® On the other hand, in Europe the system 
works through the mixed-scanning mechanism “That mixed-scanning 
mechanism works through to meet the expectations of electorates and stop 
diversion of their interest into other non-constitutional structures’’” .^
In Turkey we can not talk about such a mechanism; the inherited 
patron-client relation is still the engine of Turkish politics, which is fused in 
every sphere of social relation, but most effectively shaped in economic 
relations. So we can say that the most important criteria for European Union; 
being able to adopt.the transparent and divisible policies, shaping economic 
and political relations within the system itself is non-existent in Turkey. And its 
effects transferred with a fusion to other elements; democracy, human rights, 
economic competence.
These shall not be evaluated differently from culture. Actually these 
material failures are the culmination of the cultural gap between the two sides.
ibid. p.41
quoted in Bülent Gökay (eds) Türkiye Avrupa 'run Neresinde, Ayraç, Ankara, 1997. P.25
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PART3
Integration and Exclusion in the European Union’s Expansion Practise:
A) Rhetoric of The European Union
Iver Neumann examining integration exclusion offers to look for 
anthropology and nationalism to guide a culture sensitive study. According to 
Neumann “there exists only a single anthropological monograph on the topic, 
a study of identity formation not inside one of the institutions of European 
Union, but in the European Space Agency”’ ®^ That collectivist’s definition adds 
another dimension to the study of European identity that has to be examined 
within the parameters of nationalism. Because, “if it is true that each 
nationalism begins with a real or fabricated common enemy then the current 
image of America in Europe may well become the beginning of a new pan- 
European nationalism’’^^  ^ . That is why Central European states make queue 
for European Union membership. Neumann states that:
“the language of Central Europe project is similar to that of 
nationalism, in as much as it tries to turn the political field into a 
battleground between the groups that are not only culturally, ethnically 
defined. Integration of central Europe is advocated at the price of exclusion 
of Russia”'^ l
119 ibid p.23
Iver B. Neumann “European Identity, European Union E.xpansion and tlie Integration /Exclusion 
Nexus”, Social Transformation and Human Governance, July-Septeinber 1998, Volume 23, Issue 3, p.2 
ibid, p.2
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B) The Applicant Rhetoric.
Three common features of the rhetoric of which applicant states avail 
themselves when they represent their states as European are;
1) There is always a reference to history. This may be because 
each and every applicant state is severely caught up in a logic 
of identity formation dominated by the historical experience.
2) The East is constructed on political terms; the idea of othering 
each other as “Eastern” has a long history and is still valid.
3) It is believed that regime homogeneity will be sustained by 
European Union membership: the applicant states try to 
exclude the internal elements from taking over, changing the 
regime type.
As a former Prime Minister of Turkey, Tansu Ciller, told a journalist from 
Time during the run-up to the negotiations of a free trade treaty, which was 
viewed an important step on the way to membership, “ ...a failure by European 
Union to have a positive attitude would certainly propel the Islamist Welfare 
Party to power, and thus tip Turkey further toward the Middle East and away 
from Europe’’^^ '^
In short, European Union represents a belonging as the one to be 
preferred. Thus Union determined to protect the solidarity of European 
identity. The proof is how they conceive the “true integration". Karsten 
Hoppenstedt, a member of European Parliament sent a massage through 
Time saying "these are indeed historic times for Europe as the halves, once 
divided by war and ideology look to came together in one house”. I t  is clear
122ibid, p.6
ibid, p.7
Time, November 25, 1995
125 ibid, p.l33.
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that the furthest east of European Union encompasses Eastern European 
states; Turkey is not mentioned at ail.
C) European Union’s Stand Towards the East:
A Comparison Between Visegrad Countries and Turkey:
Currently enlargement is one of the main issues that is on the agenda 
of the European Union. As perfectly described by William Wallace “the mental 
maps which have guided West European leaders for the last three to four 
decades were being challenged, both by the re-emergence of the old maps of 
historical Europe and by the imaginary of the global market and of the Pacific 
as an alternative focus to Atlantic”^ .
The first signs of such a reconstruction process began to be observed 
with the recent enlargement decision in the European Union, regarding the 
accession of Sweden, Finland, Austria and Norway. Now the inclusion of the 
so called Visegrad^^^ countries (Poland, Hungary, The Czech Republic and 
Slovakia) seems to be under consideration, enjoying the European Union’s 
special attention. On the other hand, Turkey is on the way to reach the unique 
status of becoming the only country that has acquiesced into full Customs 
Union before reaching full member status.
William W allace,, The Transformation o f Western £'i/ropg, Pinter Publishers, London, 1990, p.5. 
Tlie institutionalization of cooperation between these countries take place on 15 February 1991 in 
tlie Hungarian town of Visegrad, Uie site of a similar gatliering in 1335. Tlie aim of the summit was to 
work towards tlie simultaneous retiun to Europe.
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If it is to be put explicitly Turkey, the second country to become an 
associate member six years after the Treaty of Rome, which was signed in 
1957, has been excluded from the historical process of European integration. 
Turkey does not appear to be there in the new European architecture.
At the Copenhagen summit in June 1993, The European Union leaders 
explicitly recognized Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia as 
prospective European Union member whereas they constrained relations with 
Turkey only with the Customs Union.
Emphasis on the European identity is a typical feature of the Visegrad 
region. “The isolation from Europe in the post-war years widely perceived as 
one of the most painful effects of Soviétisation”. This understanding finds its 
expression in Hungary’s foreign minister Mr. Jezsenky’s words, who stated 
that his country in its request for admission to European Union “was guided by 
the will to return to this community to which it has always belong to”^^® in 
Athens on 1®‘ of April 1994.
During the early stages of negotiations with the original members of the 
European Union, leading to Association Agreement in 1983, Turkey’s cultural 
geographical distance from Brussels was not as prominent as it would later 
become. One explanation is that, “the community wished to enhance its 
international status by increasing its sphere of influence in those early days.
M Skak, ‘The EC Policy and the Visegrad Countries.In Norgaard , Petresen, Pedersen (eds), The
European Community in World Politics,Pinter publishers, London, I993,p.l22.
129 Agency Europe, 6 April 1994.
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and hence, welcomed the initial application from Turkey to enter into the 
Association Agreement”^^ °
Turkey’s relations with the European Union have always been 
influenced by strategic and political factors and by economic development. 
However, recently cultural and religious considerations stated to be important 
regarding the issue of Turkey’s Europeanness. Shortly as put forward by 
Birand “Turkey is not on the agenda of Europe that is quite busy with giving a
final shape to its borders'..131
Economic problems, democratic deficiencies and political conflicts are 
utilised as welcome scapegoats for a much more fundamental unwillingness to 
accept Turkey as a member of the European Union. On the other hand 
historical and cultural Europeanness of Visegrad countries seems to cover all 
its deficiencies.
130 AJimet E v i n , Communitarian Structures, Values and Cultural Behavior in Turkey. In A.Evin, and 
G. Denton, {t6s),Turkey and European Community.Op\ax\A: Leske u Budrich, Gennany, p.94.
M. A. Birand, ’Avrupa Son Smrlanm Çizerken Türkiye Yok’, Sahalı 11 Mayıs 1994.
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CONCLUSION
The aim of the study was to unfold the systematic domination of the 
universal truth which was presented as a silver plate project - Modernization 
together with discursive tool Orientalism - within the parameters of Critical 
Theory.
Because, this historically constructed categories representing a 
hegemonic relation, reproducing the domination of the universal truth paved 
the way to internalization of Orientalism, enforced a single path of 
Modernization. The outcome was the creation of new 'forms' of societies which 
were left in between. Turkey is a perfect example of those societies, which was 
unable to use the cultural potential available to it, outflanking the traditional 
norms. The empowered hyperrealities to reproduce the monoculture of 
modernization by state agencies could not prevent the formation of the crack 
within the society; the change agent of the Turkish society pushed for 
Modernization which is identified as Westernisation while the defensive 
elements were longing to preserve the traditional Identity.
It is still that counter balance which Is framing the dynamics of the 
relation within Turkish society and carrying Turkey in to the international arena. 
As Critical Theory argues the nature of modernization created scarcities in 
meaning and left the individual and the society searching for an identity. 
Turkey' s longing for integration into The European Union is derived by that 
basic instinct by the motivation to be identified as a European counterpart.
65
However the systemic illusionment of difference between the two 
partners are enlarging the gap between the two cultures, and still introducing 
Turkish and European culture as binary oppositions.
Therefore, an assessment of the cultural integration of Turkey with The 
European Union should be viewed against the extremely different 
backgrounds from which contemporary Turkey and Europe or ig ina ted .As a 
result of this, not surprisingly The European Union draw cultural boundaries 
together with its geographical boundaries implicitly defining a European 
identity as a basis of the membership.
The reasons behind this conditional coexistence in the international 
arena discussed with its all dimensions in this study from the very beginning to 
the last appointment at the margins of The European Union. Where we 
reached is not surprising, but discouraging for Turkey. On 12 July, 1999 
Turkey faced with the historical confession made unofficially, but by the 
Secretary General of Foreign Affairs Committee of The European Union, Tom 
Spencer. According to Spencer, “for the sake of political priorities and tactics 
The European Union is detaining Turkey. Turkey is never going to be part of 
Europe and will remain in between the pressures of fundamentalist Islam and 
The European Union’s unfilled promises”.
In fact Spencer is putting forward the important problem of 
Modernization which turned out to be a deadlock. In order to overcome this
Udo, Steinbach, op.cit. p. 15 
Cumhuriyet, 12.07.1999
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deadlock of Modernization, it should seize to construct a socio-political and 
cultural binary opposition. In other words, Turkish Modernization should be 
rethought without falling into the traps of general categorizations which 
sometimes presented as universalism. As the recent historical experiences 
began to prove that; without the balance between the universal and the 
particular, the social fiber of a society condemned to perish.
To sum up, this study tries to evoke such questions as To what 
extend Turkey did manage to go all the way to Europe, to what extend cultural 
integration may be possible?’ and To what extend does European identity 
allow cultural diversity and cultural integration?’ by intending to bring to the 
fore the systematic configurations of both diversities.
As a last word we can say that if the legitimacy is the tangible product 
of a culture then to formulate a legitimate social identity, social policy initiators 
has to seek a synthesis rather than enforcement of either the Eastern or the 
Western identity. Otherwise Turkey cannot cope with this major problem either 
within The European Union or out of The European Union.
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